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ABSTRACT 
 Kant’s evaluation of music in the Critique of Judgement stands as a blemish on an 
otherwise appealing system of judgments of beauty and of assigning aesthetic worth. In order to 
resolve this tension, I will present an argument in three parts. First, I will delve further into 
Kantian judgments of beauty to provide solid contextual grounds for why he draws his 
conclusions about music and will further elaborate on his various positions concerning music. 
Second, I will look at a few potential answers for the problem of music given by others in the 
philosophy of music and briefly evaluate their effectiveness. Third, I will turn to my answers for 
the central hurdles preventing Kant from classifying music as a beautiful/fine art form: the 
problems of representation, content, and beauty being symbolic of morality. 
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A SONG OF CONFUSION AND ANNOYANCE: 
KANT ON THE BEAUTY OF ABSOLUTE MUSIC 
 Though he is often thought of for his writings in ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment represents a landmark contribution to the philosophies of 
art and beauty. In fact, he stands among the few major philosophers who present a codified 
system of aesthetics as a significant portion of their overall philosophical thought. The detailed 
picture he paints of aesthetic judgments and his systematic treatment of the arts provides a useful 
paradigm for those of us who love discussing art and beauty to follow. However, Kant’s 
otherwise interesting work in the first part of the third Critique is held back by the few 
perplexing claims he makes about the beauty of absolute music1, or music that is purely 
instrumental. Unlike the relatively stable ideas that precede his discussion of music, his position 
on the art form is not altogether clear. In §51, his argument is that music’s formal structure, as he 
understands it at least, is such that it cannot be reliably evaluated as beautiful in all instances, 
while in other passages make it seem as though he is generally annoyed by instrumental music. 
 This vague characterization of Kant’s opinion of music requires further elaboration to 
show why they are problematic for his theories of beauty and art more generally, but for now, it 
is sufficient for describing the problem I seek to address here. Aspects of the aesthetics portion 
of the third Critique would be incredibly appealing if not for the vexing questions that arise 
because of what Kant says about music. Why, for instance, must we be able to be able to
                                                        
1 Hereafter, ‘music’ refers solely to absolute music unless otherwise specified. 
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distinguish vibrations of individual tones in order to determine the beauty of entire compositions, 
as he says we must in §14 and §51? 
 Kant’s understanding of music’s form certainly sounds strange, for tones are hardly, if 
ever, taken to be beautiful in isolation but always are listened to in the context of a rich tapestry 
of harmonies and melodies spread through time in rhythm. To say that we must reduce music to 
singular tones to find music’s beauty would be to say that we must also reduce to singular letters 
the lines that make up each word in a poem to find its beauty or to single out a tenth-of-an-inch 
of marble in the statue of David to judge it to be the work of a master. Peter Kivy (2000) puts it 
best, stating: 
…what Kant’s musical formalism totally lacked was any real recognition of the ‘logic’ 
behind the form. He gave little evidence, in his reflections on music, of having any 
knowledge of the principles that lay at the heart of musical structure. His musical 
formalism was a fruitful idea, but an empty one, really. What it required was fleshing out 
in real musical terms (p. 60). 
Without appealing to what actually constitutes music’s structure, Kant lacks the tools necessary 
to make true judgments as to the possibility of its beauty or agreeableness. 
 Putting aside his formal considerations of music, another set of questions deals with 
whether or not Kant’s personal taste colors his philosophical consideration.  In §53, he likens 
music to “the practice of regaling oneself with a perfume that exhales its odours far and 
wide…[treating] all around to it whether they like it or not, and [compelling] them, if they want 
to breathe at all, to be parties to the enjoyment,” essentially infringing on the freedom of unwary 
passersby (§53: 330). Not even the singing of hymns at family prayers escape Kant’s scorn, “for 
they compel their neighbors either to join in the singing or else abandon their meditations” (§53: 
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330, footnote). In the same section, he cites music’s “oppressive” tendency to be recalled by the 
imagination unbidden as reason for it having less aesthetic value. Is a song’s tendency for getting 
stuck in your head truly reason enough to say music is not as valuable as the formative and 
rhetorical arts? In the coming sections, we will see that this may be a violation of one of Kant’s 
tenets of beauty, but let us save that discussion for later. For now, suffice it say that Kant does 
not seem to have a great affinity for music. 
 These elements together—his confusion concerning music’s formal elements and his 
general annoyance in being exposed to its practice—are comparable to a dominant chord in a 
harmonic progression never being properly resolved. My purpose will be an attempt to bring this 
harsh dissonance to a satisfying resolution. First, I will delve further into Kantian judgments of 
beauty to provide solid contextual grounds for why he draws his conclusions about music and 
will further elaborate on his various positions concerning music. Second, I will look at a few 
potential answers for the problem of music given by others in the philosophy of music and 
briefly evaluate their effectiveness. Third, I will turn to my answers for the central hurdles 
preventing Kant from classifying music as a beautiful/fine art form: the problems of 
representation, content, and beauty being symbolic of morality. By considering the unique 
tripartite relation of musical performance—that is, the interaction between contentless object, 
performer, and audience—I argue that music not only possesses the capacity to move one 
emotionally but also “has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interests 
of social communication” for at least some participants in the relation and, by extension, furthers 
their moral education (§44: 306). These reasons in concert with the evaluation provided in the 
second section will prove that, by Kant’s own standards, music should be reevaluated in his 
hierarchy of the arts.
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SETTING THE STAGE 
 Kant’s terminology in the third critique is very novel and idiosyncratic, so before any 
attempted resolution can begin, it will be necessary that we discuss his discussion of beauty from 
the first four moments along with his definitions for a variety of other terms, including free 
beauty, adherent beauty, fine art, agreeable art, etc. Then, I must explain Kant’s various 
arguments concerning the beauty and aesthetic worth of absolute music. The next set of 
subsections will set the stage for the resolution of Kant’s harmonic dissonance in the third 
Critique. 
Kantian Beauty 
 Those familiar with the complexity of Kant’s work in other areas of philosophy will not 
be disappointed in his aesthetics, as he puts forward some unusual suggestions as to what might 
be going on when we judge a thing to be beautiful.  For Kant, pure aesthetic judgments of taste, 
for example, involve a delight in a particular mode of representation of an art object totally 
divorced from personal interest in its agreeableness, or how it pleases or displeases in sensation. 
That is, a desire or disgust for a particular piece of art or even for the experience of viewing a 
particular piece of art prevents a true judgment of beauty, for, then, one is only concerned with 
how an art object is useful for them. Objects of disinterested judgments are worthy of the label 
“beautiful” (§5: 211). Furthermore, judgments of beauty are distinct from those of delight in the 
goodness of objects, as delight in the goodness of objects manifestly imputes the interest of all 
rational agents (§4: 207-208). 
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His second definition of beauty involves a particular use of the concept of universality. 
More specifically, “the beautiful is that which, apart from any concept, pleases universally” (§9: 
219). Kant is not suggesting that there is some rule by which multiple beautiful objects share in 
an objective sense of beautifulness, for then multiple subjects would be compelled to recognize 
it. Kant flatly rejects this notion from the very beginning of the third Critique. Rather, true 
judgments of beauty, according to Kant, are spoken in a universal voice such that when one 
makes the claim “thing X is beautiful” she is attributing that judgment to everyone. Because the 
judgment is unregulated by a particular concept, the cognitive powers of imagination and 
understanding the subject exist in a state of free play, wherein the inner imaginative world 
inspired by the art object and the subject’s reflection on what lies within it exist in harmony (§9: 
217). 
Beyond disinterest and subjective universality, Kant provides two additional aspects of 
beauty. From the third moment, he derives that beauty is a form of purposiveness in an object 
without the clear representation of purpose, or end (§17: 236). This is an extension of his claim 
about disinterest, for, as has already discussed, Kant couples his discussion of disinterest with a 
discussion of delight in the utility and in the goodness of objects. Just as delight in the utility or 
goodness of objects taints judgments of beauty, they cannot be founded on any known end, be it 
subjective delight/utility or objective goodness. The attribution of ends necessarily imputes 
interest to the judgment (§11: 221).  And lastly, in the fourth moment Kant says, “the beautiful is 
that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of necessary delight” (§22: 240). This 
sense of necessity here is not binding to the degree of logical necessity. Disinterest, universality, 
purposiveness, and necessity: with these four conditions met along with a feeling of delight, Kant 
argues we are justified in calling objects beautiful. 
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Later on, Kant makes a further qualification about beauty that will be important in 
considering the aesthetic worth of absolute music: the distinction between free and adherent 
beauty. Were one to make a judgment following the path shown by Kant in the first four 
moments of the third Critique—that is, if “the object is considered apart from its charms, and the 
judgment is not dependent upon any concept of what the thing is to be”—it would be called a 
free beauty (Weatherston, 1996, p. 57). However, adherent beauty combines a presupposition of 
a certain purpose of an artwork with the perfection of the object according to that purpose, where 
perfection is “the relation between the way we cognize the object (and the consequent harmony 
of our faculties) and the purpose of the art object” (p. 57) The advantage of adherent beauty over 
free beauty, according to Weatherston, is that it allows for the communication of certain aesthetic 
ideas, which, in turn, allow art to express moral ideas while still being free of mere 
agreeableness. 
Fine Art 
 Jumping further into the first part of the third Critique, we see that Kant develops a 
theory of fine art. In §44, he starts with a few distinctions. First, he states that when art merely 
seeks “to actualize a possible object to the cognition of which it is adequate, performs whatever 
acts are required for that purpose, then it is mechanical” (305). Mechanical art is only beautiful 
when it immediately inspires a feeling of pleasure. Based on what seems like a combination of 
artist intent and the social/moral effects of the artwork, aesthetic art can be further broken down 
into two categories: agreeable art and fine art. Agreeable art, he argues, has simple enjoyment for 
its object and must include “play of every kind which is attended with no further interest than 
that of making the time pass by unheeded” (306). Here, he specifically cites the music of an 
orchestra at banquets as an example, for music in this context is used to promote “a genial spirit” 
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without anyone having to be pay attention to it. Without inspiring reflection on the form of the 
art object, agreeable arts are fundamentally lesser. 
 Fine arts fill a fundamentally different role for Kant. The primary difference between 
agreeable art and fine art is that the pleasure inspired by fine art is accompanied by a particular 
mode of cognition, or representation. Because the pleasure associated with fine art is 
accompanied by a representation, the imagination can be tempered by reason. This mode of 
representation is “intrinsically purposive” and “although devoid of an end, has the effect of 
advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interests of social communication” (§44: 306). 
Fine art’s intrinsic purposiveness is fundamentally intentional, but it must lack the appearance of 
intentionality. That is, art objects must be pleasing in the mere judging of them such that they are 
not, prima facie at least, specified by the intentions of artists (§45: 307).  Fine arts, moreover, are 
the products of genius, which is the innate talent in artists that gives structure to art. 
 For Kant, works of fine art must possess two characteristics: formal beauty and deep 
representational content (Kivy, 2002, p. 58). Early in the third critique, Kant clearly states that 
pure judgments of taste rely solely on the form of objects, and if objects lack a suitably 
appreciable form, then they cannot be adequately evaluated. He specifically cites a non-descript 
painting for illustration, arguing that although the colors may bring charm, it is the mastery of 
formal design in the painting that allow it to be judged accurately (§14: 225). We have already 
had a brief foray into the some of the components of deep representational content in describing 
adherent beauty. For Kant, art has two kinds of content. First, art has its surface level content, or 
what Kivy calls ‘manifest content.’  Think of this kind of content as an artwork’s easily 
identifiable characteristics (e.g. the main plot threads of a novel, the subject of a painting, etc.). 
In arts of genius, the surface content “sets in motion, in its audience, a rich chain of ideas, the 
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‘aesthetic ideas,’ Kant calls them, which proliferate indefinitely, giving the work its deep, albeit 
ineffable content: it can be felt, so to say, but never explicitly stated” (Kivy, 2002, p. 57). That 
which is animated by the deep content of fine art is the viewer/listener’s spirit. 
 The final but most crucial aspect of fine art is that it must either reference or symbolize 
some moral content. Of this, Kant cannot be clearer: 
The matter of sensation (charm or emotion) is not essential. Here the aim is mere 
enjoyment, which leaves nothing behind it with regard to the idea, and renders the spirit 
dull, the object in the course of time distasteful, and the mind dissatisfied with itself and 
ill-humoured, owing to a consciousness that in the judgment of reason its mood is 
contrary to purpose…Where fine arts art not, either closely or remotely, brought into 
combination with moral ideas, which alone are attended with a self-sufficing delight, the 
above is the fact that ultimately awaits them (§52: 326). 
So, not only must fine art have deep content but also that content must itself be in concert with 
moral ideas. 
Kant on the Beauty of Music 
 With all that out of the way, we can now turn to what Kant actually says about music. His 
first mention of anything related to the topic comes in §14 where he uses simple tones and colors 
to show how pure judgments of taste must be made without consideration of an object’s charm or 
of any other emotion it may inspire. Single tones or colors are “described by most people as in 
[themselves] beautiful, notwithstanding the fact that both seem to depend merely on the matter of 
the representations—in other words, simply on sensation, which only entitles them to be called 
agreeable” (224). Tones, he continues, can only be universally communicated if they are pure, 
and tonal purity depends on an evaluation of form. The forms of tones, as has already been 
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mentioned in this paper, are simply vibrations of the air. Should the apprehension of simple tones 
be disturbed by any other kind of sensation, then the state of purity is broken and the tone cannot 
be considered beautiful. 
 So far, I have only referenced Kant’s discussion of pure tones, but it should be noted that 
simple colors act in a similar manner. This is especially important to consider near the end of 
§14: 224 as he makes a claim about composite colors2 that he fails to make about composite 
tones. He says that “[c]omposite colors do not possess this advantage, not being simple, there is 
no standard for judging whether they should be called pure or impure.” If one assume that by 
‘composite colors’ he means non-primary colors, then any color other than red, yellow, and blue 
cannot be reliably judged to be pure and, therefore, beautiful. Though not as obvious at first, the 
problem of composite tones is even more staggering. If, for instance, we take a set of harmonies 
played in a solo piano composition, one could argue for the purity of the harmonies, as the 
sounds of the individual tones seem to be in sync, given that the piano is properly tuned. What if 
the piece calls for the piano to be out of tune? Furthermore, Kant fails to consider pieces that call 
for an assortment of instruments with each instrument having a unique voice. With all these 
voices in unison, Kant’s conception of purity of tone could never be established by the mere 
judging of a piece of music. 
 This worry aside, Kant nevertheless allows for the beauty of pure tones and colors and 
even admits that their charm invigorates our perception of both paintings and works of absolute 
music. However, it is “the design in the former and the composition in the latter” that constitutes 
“the proper object of the pure judgment of taste” (§14: 225). His suggestion that tones and colors 
contribute to beauty is not meant to place them on equal footing with the artwork’s form. The 
                                                        
2 Kant’s conception of composite colors is not well defined. He could mean non-primary colors, as I suggest. He 
could mean the kinds of unique colors created when artists combine different paints, or he could be referring to two 
colors sitting side by side. In any case, the comparison I want to make to all the ways tones combine is unaffected. 
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importance of his use of composition here should be highlighted, as his reference to composition 
as the ‘design’ for music seems to be his only appeal to another formal consideration for music 
other than sonic vibrations such that the former supplants the latter. In the proceeding sections, 
he moves away from this recognition and back toward the reduction of judgment of music to the 
cognition of single tones. 
Music in Kant’s Hierarchy of the Arts 
 As previously mentioned, §51 and §53 in the Analytic of the Sublime divide the fine arts 
into categories and compares them for their aesthetic worth. Absolute music ranks near the 
bottom in terms of beauty but near the top in agreeableness and charm (Parret, 1998, p. 255). He 
classifies music under arts of the beautiful play of sensations, “which is a play of sensations that 
has nevertheless to permit of universal communication” and “can only be concerned with the 
proportion of the different degrees of attunement (tension) in the sense to which the sensation 
belongs” (§51: 324). The sense to which music belongs, of course, is hearing. More specifically, 
the cognition of and reflection on particular tones—that is, the apprehension of the mathematical 
characters of the proportions of their individual sonic vibrations—are what is required to reliably 
judge a work of music to be a beautiful play of sensations. However, most people lack the ability 
to judge tones this way, save perhaps those with perfect pitch. Therefore, music cannot be 
reliably judged as either an agreeable sensation or a beautiful play of sensations; it is situated in 
the void between agreeable art and fine art (Reed, 1980, p. 569). Call Kant’s argument here the 
tonal reduction argument. 
 The problem of assigning aesthetic worth to music is rooted in the tonal reduction 
argument for the following reasons. Only fine art inspires a particular mode of cognition that is 
universally communicable and that furthers the development of the culture of social and moral 
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capacities in the listener while agreeable art is only meant for enjoyment. In order to classify 
music as a fine art (i.e. a beautiful play of the sensations), we must be able to apprehend the 
purity of individual tones. However, according to Kant, the central mover of the mind in the 
apprehension of music is not the mathematical proportion of tones. Instead, those features only 
serve as: 
…the indispensable condition…of that proportion of coming as well as changing 
impressions which makes it possible to grasp them all in one and prevent them from 
destroying one another, and to let them, rather, conspire towards the production of a 
continuous movement and enlivening the mind by affects that are in unison with it, and 
thus towards a contended self-enjoyment (§53: 329).  
So, absolute music is of little value culturally, ranking somewhere close to joke telling 
(Weatherston, 1996, p. 56). However, the degree to which it moves the spirit emotionally is 
second only to poetry. 
 Kant gives three other arguments in §53 that have been alluded to here already. First, he 
criticizes absolute music for its transience because it moves the mind from sensations to 
indeterminate ideas (330). The ideas received through hearing music are indeterminate because 
they lack content, and content is necessary for the melding of imagination and understanding in a 
true judgment of taste. He juxtaposes absolute music with the formative arts, arguing that they 
are clearly superior because they move the mind from determinate ideas (i.e. deep content) to 
sensations and, thus, allow for the free play of imagination and understanding. Accordingly, 
formative art has an enduring impact on our rational nature. The sensations given by absolute 
music, conversely, fail to do so, extinguishing quickly “or, else, if involuntarily repeated by the 
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imagination, are more oppressive to us than agreeable.” Essentially, music is not as valuable 
because songs can, for lack of a better phrase, get stuck in one’s head. 
 Finally, absolute music’s medium, sound, does not lend itself well to being practiced in 
civilized society: 
Over and above all this, music has a certain lack of urbanity about it. For owing chiefly to 
the character of its instruments, it scatters its influence abroad to an uncalled-for extent 
(through the neighborhood), and thus, as it were, becomes obtrusive and deprives others, 
outside the musical circle of their freedom. This is a thing that the arts that address 
themselves to the eye do not do, for if one is not disposed to give admittance to their 
impressions, one has only to look the other way (§53: 330). 
Kant makes the analogy of music to the overuse of perfume, even going as far in a footnote to 
this claim as to accuse the singing of hymns at family prayers to be obnoxious. This argument 
together with the transience/unwanted recall argument and the tonal reduction argument are his 
justifications for music having lower overall cultural value than the rhetorical and formative arts. 
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CRITIQUING THE CRITIQUE OF MUSIC 
 Critical analysis of the four arguments against the value of absolute music has led to 
some disagreement among philosophers of music. A common complaint is that his understanding 
of music (or lack thereof) leads him to make some unjustified assumptions about its form. Martin 
Weatherston (1996) argues that Kant’s misinterpretation of music’s form and potential moral 
content is strange, considering the periods of music history he lived through: “…for the Baroque 
music of his youth, which showed a great interest in exploiting the formal aspect of music 
through polyphonic writing; for Classical music, which depends on the apprehension of long-
term harmonic and thematic relationships; and for the Romantic music…since [it] explicitly 
attempted to express moral ideas through purely musical means” (p. 63). Further, he is in 
agreement with Kivy in that Kant’s failure to consider rhythm, pitch, and timbre in his evaluation 
of music leaves his explanation of its aesthetic worth hollow. Had he realized that rhythm gives 
structure to harmony and melody through time; that by manipulating the pitch of tones, 
musicians refine his all-important mathematical proportions to enhance the beauty of music; or 
that ‘timbre’, or the unique sounds of individual instruments, are more aptly analogous to colors, 
his evaluation of music might be more convincing. 
That music is tightly organized is easily established. A musician or conductor’s 
assessment of the form of a piece involves considering its basic melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic 
structure through studying a the score, a musical term for the printed sheets of music that serve 
as a road map for the performance of piece.  By glancing at a score, one can see that formal 
considerations in music truly dwarf the complexity of the recognizable forms of the rhetorical
14 
 
and pictorial arts.  Each instrument plays a specific role in the production of a piece with all of 
them working together in a determined way.  The varying tonal colors of individual instruments 
provide effects ranging from warmth to shrillness provide a wide variety of tools for composers 
to use to shape their creations (Weatherston, 1996, p. 64).  Appreciating the form of music may 
require some specialized knowledge, but it does not follow from music’s form being not widely 
accessible that there is no form at all to be appreciated. 
Music’s formal considerations aside, whether music has semantic content must be 
considered. Kivy (2002) and Parrett (1998) argue that Kant is right about music’s semantic 
emptiness but that its lack of content constitutes its greatest strength. Kivy (2002) follows the 
tradition of Arnold Schopenhauer, arguing that the primary strength of fine arts is that they are 
liberate us from the constraints of everyday life. Absolute music is most useful for this task 
because it makes no reference to the external world and, as a result, creates art worlds unique to 
individual works of music (p. 259). Parret (1998) approach is to show that absolute music is 
more prototypically art-like than any other art form considered in the third Critique because 
“[m]usic does not make us think; rather it causes us to reflect and to dream more than any other 
art: to bring about ‘dream-like thought’”(p. 260).  This state of reflection is exactly what Kant 
thinks fine art should inspire. 
The most common tactic used to show that music has semantic content involves its ability 
to resemble emotions. Samantha Matherne (2014) argues that music can be judged as beautiful 
or agreeable depending on the attitude we take in the judging of it (p. 137-8). In explaining this, 
she juxtaposes a person in Kant’s imagined social gathering in §41 actually paying attention to 
the background composition instead of enjoying the party. Further, she appeals to a speech-based 
resemblance theory of emotions to explain music’s potential semantic content with a few 
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caveats. According to her, Kant actually argues, “familiar affects and tones are enriched with an 
aesthetic idea” instead of simply mimicking emotions (p.140). Next, she interprets Kant as 
arguing that music can further develop these aesthetic ideas and as developing a “compelling 
analysis of the phenomenology of our experience of emotion in music (p. 140). 
The problems with her arguments are twofold. First, while attentiveness may be a 
necessary condition in true judgments of taste, talk of personal attitudes might verge on breaking 
the requirement of disinterest established in the first moment. It is not clear to me whether 
having devotion to a specific artwork would violate this for Kant. Second, even if it is the case 
that music has this capacity, whatever emotion it mimics would still be indeterminate such that 
all listeners would not be able to glean exactly the same semantic content and then have their 
spirits be moved by deep, aesthetic ideas. Overall, the strict reading of Kant proposed by 
Weatherston, Kivy, and Parrett is more appealing. 
Kant, by omission, also dismisses the composer-performer-listener relationship that is 
unique to musical performance.  The beauty of music is that it has its origins in the genius of a 
composer, but it is always delivered through an intermediary agent, the performer, whose is also 
a fundamental part of how a work is realized.  The ideas imbued by the composer’s use of 
musical structures, how he or she builds up tension and brings it to a satisfying conclusion, and 
how he or she divides the sections of a piece of music into understandable parts with both similar 
and dissimilar ideas are all as fundamental to a characterization of form as the basic mechanics 
of its perception.  Further, these emotions and ideas, though penned by the composer, are also 
infused with the performer’s interpretation before being delivered to the listener such that no 
single performance is the same as any other. 
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This feature of music leads to the sense of transience Kant references, for it can, to some 
extent, obscure an appraisal of its form envisioned by the composer by the mere appreciation of 
it by a listener.  A performance of “Jupiter, the Bringer of Jollity” from Gustav Holst’s The 
Planet’s Suite by the New York Philharmonic, for example, will not be numerically identical to a 
performance of that same piece by London’s Royal Philharmonic Orchestra.  But, one can avoid 
that sense of transience by recognizing that certain fundamental features of a work remain 
constant through multiple iterations, making them at least qualitatively identical.  The basic ideas 
established by a composer are constantly held through interpretations, transpositions, and 
changes in instrumentation.  The opening fanfare of Mozart’s The Marriage of Figaro has been 
transcribed many times for instrumentations that include instruments that were not introduced to 
the musical scene until well past the point of its composition, but, despite this, the spirit of his 
work is maintained. 
 Kant’s dismissal of the performer’s role also prevents him from seeing where music’s 
potential for moral instruction lies.  I would agree that instrumental music, as a purely abstract 
expression of artistic ideas, is not primarily morally instructive for the listener, but the process of 
building up musical acumen provides a number of benefits that are at least analogous to 
developing morally traits. Generations of fledgling musicians have been taught the importance of 
both the individual voice and how the individual must give way to the collective in order to 
produce something truly special. For example, musicians often train both individually with 
specialists in their specific instrument, and through frequent contact with their musicians-in-arms 
in small groups and large ensembles, they are taught the value of healthy competition tempered 
by a love of those around them with whom they easily sympathize.  Achieving musical 
excellence is all the more gratifying when surrounded by others intent on reaching it together.  
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The ever-present process of development for the novice and for the professional alike 
fosters creativity, critical thinking, perseverance, and a willingness to habitually work toward 
excellence. This process of musical development for the performer is at least comparable to the 
processes of inculcating certain mental and moral capacities, if it does not instill the capacities 
outright. Some philosophers, most famously Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, use the 
learning of instruments as a paradigmatic case for learning the virtues. That is, the virtues can 
only be learned if one approaches them like she would learn the flute or the violin: with habitual, 
consistent, and never-ending practice and performance. Further, empirical work into how 
learning to be a musician affects one’s abilities in other areas of cognitive development exists 
and shows that music has some positive impact. However, my purpose here is only to prove that 
music deserves more attention that Kant gives it in this ranking of the arts. Alluding to the body 
of work done on the effects of music on cognitive development will suffice. 
One might object that it is the listener to whom Kant claims the moral benefit must be 
directed. While my argument is that the moral benefit of absolute music is primarily for the 
performer, there are moral lessons that can be gleaned by viewing a performance if one thinks of 
the performer as a kind of moral exemplar. Allow me to immediately address the objection that 
artists (and often musicians especially) are often the agents that least deserve the status of ‘moral 
exemplars.’ However, I propose that the best kinds of musical performances, those that are the 
product of the genius of composer and instrumentalist, demonstrate a sort of unity of all of the 
virtues necessary to create their masterful art such that viewers can see the ultimate expression of 
musical excellence. This expression of excellence can, in turn, become an analogy for the 
expression of the perfect expression of moral virtue, and while the performer’s personal life may 
be flawed, the act of performing to this degree makes her briefly a moral exemplar.  
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One could also object that this attempt to save music from Kant’s critique that it lacks 
moral content fails because the moral content is not intrinsic to the art itself but only to how the 
art form is used in general. Because I agree with Kant that music lacks semantic content, there is 
no way to get around this objection other than to say that its instrumental value is sufficient 
evidence for proposing the need for its reevaluation. 
 The last and most easily dealt with arguments against music’s value are the urbanity, 
transience, and unwanted recall arguments. The interpretation of Kant presented here, I think, 
has presented good evidence for Kant’s general distaste for music in general. In at least two 
instances in §53 he all but calls the art form a blight on modern society simply because it extends 
its reach beyond those who are actively participating in its practice. These passages do not 
provide a disinterested account of music’s beauty and are consequently tainted. Further, the 
transience and unwanted recall arguments seem to contradict one another, for how could music 
be transient if it is on constant replay in one’s mind? These arguments are perhaps the easiest to 
combat of all the ones considered here.
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REEVALUTING MUSIC’S PLACE IN THE HIERARCHY 
 Although he plants the seeds of musical formalism, Kant’s song of confusion and 
annoyance rings out loudly as he progresses through the Critique of Judgment. Through 
explaining how Kant fails to consider what constitutes a musical work’s true form and how he 
seems to be generally angry at music for disturbing his peace of mind, I hope to have shown how 
the dissonance in Kant’s personal symphony needs to be resolved. Now, however, I would turn 
to what the symphony sounds like given the work that has been done here to resolve some of the 
issues Kant raises in the third Critique. Rather, can absolute music be considered a Kantian fine 
art? If the arguments presented here hold, music meets at least two of the criteria for fine art in 
that it possesses the capacity for developing the mental power and moral virtue of performers. 
More work must be done and/or appealed to establish a clear link between the practice of music 
and these capacities, but for now, the analogy should be enough to prompt its reconsideration. 
The semantic emptiness of absolute music, however, cannot be denied. However, Kant’s failure 
to fully consider the merits of absolute music requires further examination.
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